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Abstract 
Amnesic patients perform poorly on explicit memory tests 
that  require conscious recollection  of  recent experiences, but 
frequently show preserved facilitations of  performance orprim- 
ing effects on implicit memory tasks that do not require con- 
scious recollection. We  examined  implicit memory  for novel 
visual objects on an object decbion test in which subjects decide 
whether structurally possible and impossible objects could ex- 
ist  in  three-dimensional form. Patients with  organic memory 
disorders showed robust priming effects on this task-object 
Organic memory disorders can be produced by a variety 
of  neurological  conditions,  including  Korsakoff 's  syn- 
drome, encephalitis,  anoxia,  ruptured aneurysms, and 
head injuries. Such disorders typically involve damage to 
hippocampus, diencephalon, or basal forebrain (cf. But- 
ters & Stuss, 1989; Damasio, Graff-Radford, Eslinger, Da- 
masio, & Kassell, 1985; Squire, 1987; Weiskrantz, 1985), 
and are characterized by an impaired ability to remem- 
ber  recent  events  and learn  new information  despite 
normal intelligence, perceptual processing, and language 
function (e.g., Mayes, 1988; Rozin, 1976; Squire, 1987). 
Because amnesic patients' memory deficits can be quite 
severe-interfering  with their ability to remember even 
the most salient events of their everyday lives (e.g., Mil- 
ner, Corkin, & Teuber,  1968; Schacter, 1983; Schacter, 
Glisky, & McGlynn, 1990tit is tempting to  conclude 
that such patients suffer from a global deficit that impairs 
all forms of  memory and learning. 
A major theme of  recent neuropsychological research, 
however, is  that even patients with severe memory dis- 
orders possess  some preserved  memory abilities. Spe- 
cifically, despite  their  impaired  ability to  explicitly or 
consciously remember recent experiences and new in- 
formation, amnesic patients  often  show intact implicit 
moiy  (Graf & Schacter, 1985; Schacter, 1987a, 198713); 
that is, they show normal memory performance on tasks 
that  do not  require conscious,  explicit  recollection  of 
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decision  accuracy was  higher  for  previously  studied  objects 
than for  nonstudied  objectwand the magnitude of  priming 
did  not  differ from  matched  control subjects or college stu- 
dents. However, patients showed impaired explicit memory for 
novel visual objects on a recognition test. We argue that priming 
is  mediated by  the structural description system, a subsystem 
of  the  perceptual  representation  system, that  operates  at  a 
presemantic level and is preserved in amnesic patients. 
recent experiences. Thus, for example, amnesic patients 
can acquire perceptual and motor skills normally (e.g., 
Cohen & Squire, 1980; Milner, Corkin, & Teuber, 1968), 
exhibit robust classical conditioning (Daum, Channon, & 
Canavan,  1989; Weiskrantz  & Warrington,  1979), and 
show normal influences of  prior experience on various 
cognitive judgments (Benzing & Squire, 1989; Johnson, 
Kim, & Risse, 1985). 
Perhaps  the  most  extensively  investigated  implicit 
memory phenomenon in  patients with  memory disor- 
ders is known as repetition or direct priming:  facilitated 
identification of  words or objects from reduced percep- 
tual cues (Cofer, 1967; Tulving & Schacter, 1990). In a 
priming experiment, subjects are typically shown a list 
of  words, pictures, or some similar  stimulus materials, 
followed  by  an  implicit  memory  test  and an  explicit 
memory test. On the implicit memory test, subjects are 
required  to  perform  a task that  does not  require con- 
scious  recollection  of  the study  list,  such  as stem  or 
fvagment completion (i.e.,  completing a word stem or 
fragment with the first word that comes to mind), word 
ident@cation (i.e.,  identifying a word from a brief per- 
ceptual  exposure), or lexical  decision  (i.e., deciding 
whether  a letter  string is  a real word or a nonword). 
Priming  is  inferred  when  performance  on previously 
studied  items is  more accurate  or faster  than  perfor- 
mance on new items that were not previously studied. 
0  199I Massachusetts Institute of  Technology  Journal of  Cognitive Neuroscience  Volume 3, Number 2 On the  explicit  memory test, subjects are required  to 
think back to the study list and either recall or recognize 
the target items. The striking finding from a large number 
of  experiments, beginning with the classic work of  War- 
rington  and Weiskrantz, is  that  amnesic patients  show 
normal priming effects (e.g., Cermak, Talbot, Chandler, 
&  Wolbarst,  1985;  Cermak,  Blackford,  O’Connor,  8 
Bleich, 1788; Gabrieli, Milberg, Keane, & Corkin, 1990; 
Graf, Squire, & Mandler, 1984; Jacoby & Witherspoon, 
1982; Moscovitch, 1982; Schacter, 1985; Schacter & Graf, 
178613; Shimamura & Squire, 1984; Tulving, Hayman, & 
Macdonald, 1991; Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1968, 1974; 
for review, see Schacter, 198710; Shimamura, 1986). 
Demonstrations of  preserved priming in patients with 
impairments of  explicit memory have important impli- 
cations for theories of  memory and amnesia, because 
they suggest that priming is mediated by a brain system 
that is distinct from, and can function independently of, 
the memory system that is necessary for explicit recol- 
lection of  recent events. There is widespread agreement 
that amnesic patients suffer from impairment to an epi- 
sodic (e.g., Kinsbourne & Wood, 1975; Schacter & Tul- 
ving,  1982; Tulving,  1972,  1983)  or declarative  (e.g., 
Cohen  & Squire,  1980; Squire, 1987) memory system 
that  normally  supports  explicit  remembering  and  de- 
pends on the integrity of  brain structures that are dam- 
aged  in  amnesia.  By  contrast, there is  less agreement 
concerning  the  nature  of  the  system  or process  that 
subserves priming (cf. Cermak et al., 1985; Cohen, 1984; 
Gabrieli  et  al.,  1990;  Graf  et  al.,  1984; Moscovitch, 
Winocur, & McLachlan,  1986; Schacter,  1987b; Squire, 
1987). 
One approach to  this  latter  issue  is  provided  by  a 
general framework for understanding dissociations be- 
tween  priming  and explicit  memory that we have put 
forward  (Schacter,  1990; Schacter, Cooper, & Delaney, 
1990;  Schacter, Rapcsak, Rubens, Tharan, & Laguna, 1990; 
Tulving & Schacter, 1990). A central idea in this frame- 
work is that priming on implicit tests such as stem and 
fragment completion, word identification, or lexical de- 
cision is  to a large extent a presemantic phenomenon. 
The  key  evidence  here is  that  priming  effects do not 
require semantic processing  of  an item at  the time of 
study; robust priming is observed following nonsemantic 
study tasks, such as counting vowels and consonants in 
a word, that produce low levels of  explicit memory (cf. 
Bowers & Schacter, 1990; Graf 8 Mandler, 1984; Graf et 
al., 1984;  Jacoby & Dallas, 1981). However, priming does 
require  appropriate perceptuaVstructura1 processing at 
both study and test: Priming effects are reduced or elim- 
inated by changing the sensory modality of  presentation 
between study and test (e.g., Graf, Shimamura, & Squire, 
1985;  Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Schacter & Graf, 1989), little 
or no priming is observed between pictures and words 
(e.g.,  Weldon & Roediger, 1987), and under certain con- 
ditions, studykest changes in the exact surface form of 
an item can reduce the magnitude of  priming (e.g., Graf 
& Ryan,  1990; Roediger  & Blaxton,  1987; but see Carr, 
Brown, & Charalambous, 1989). 
The foregoing observations  suggest that  priming  ef- 
fects  on a variety of  implicit  tasks  depend heavily on 
brain  systems that operate on perceptuaVstructura1 in- 
formation, but not on semantic/associative information. 
Independent evidence for the existence of  such systems 
derives from a separate area of  research on patients with 
reading  deficits  and object  processing  deficits. In  the 
verbal domain, studies of  patients who can read words 
aloud despite severely impaired comprehension of  those 
words  (e.g., Schwartz, Saffran, & Marin, 1980) suggest 
the existence of  a presemantic visual word form system; 
in the object domain,  studies of patients who  show  intact ac- 
cess to structural knowledge about familiar objects des- 
pite impaired access to knowledge of  their functional and 
associative properties have pointed to the existence of  a 
structural description system (e.g.,  Bauer & Rubens, 1985; 
Riddoch & Humphreys, 1987; Warrington, 1975, 1982). 
We  have suggested that the word form and structural 
description systems can be thought of  as subsystems of 
a more general perceptual representation system  (PRS) 
that plays a crucial role in priming (Schacter, 1990; Tul- 
ving & Schacter, 1990; see also Gabrieli, Milberg, Keane, 
& Corkin, 1990;  Johnson, 1983). The general idea is that 
study of  a word or an object creates a representation of 
its perceptual  structure in PRS, thereby facilitating sub- 
sequent identification of  the item from reduced percep- 
tual  cues; this  facilitation  of  performance  constitutes 
implicit  memory  for  the item.  Explicit  memory for  a 
studied word or object requires an additional episodic/ 
declarative memory system that permits semantic elab- 
orations about an item as well as associations between 
an item and its context (i.e., placehime information). By 
this view, the well-established finding that amnesic pa- 
tients show intact priming of  familiar words despite poor 
explicit memory can be attributed  to  a normally func- 
tioning visual word form subsystem. In view of  evidence 
from neuroimaging studies that  the word form  system 
has an extrastriate occipital locus (Petersen, Fox, Posner, 
Mintun, & Raichle, 1989) and the fact that this cortical 
region is typically spared in patients with memory dis- 
orders, the priming data make neurobiological  as well 
as psychological sense. 
In  the  PRS  framework, priming  of  nonverbal  infor- 
mation is thought to depend on the structural description 
subsystem. Although  studies of  college  students  have 
provided  data  that  are consistent with  this  notion  (cf. 
Kersteen-Tucker, 1991; Kroll  & Potter,  1984; Musen  & 
Treisman,  1990;  Schacter,  Cooper,  &  Delaney,  1990; 
Schacter, Cooper, Delaney,  Peterson, & Tharan, 1991), 
there is little evidence from experiments with memory- 
impaired  patients  that  directly  supports  the idea  (for 
review, see Schacter, Delaney, & Merikle, 1990). Several 
studies have  shown that  exposure to  line drawings  of 
common  objects  facilitates amnesic  patients’ ability to 
identify fragmented pictures of  the objects (Milner et al., 
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however, amnesics showed less priming than did control 
subjects, perhaps because controls made use of  explicit 
memory strategies not available to amnesic patients. Var- 
ious  other  paradigms  have  also yielded  evidence  for 
priming of  familiar objects (cf. Baddeley, 1982; Crovitz, 
Harvey, & McClanahan, 1981; Meudell  & Mayes, 1981) 
and unfamiliar patterns (Cohen, Abrams, Harley, Tabor, 
Gordon, & Sejnowski, 1986) in amnesic patients, but  it 
is not clear from these experiments whether priming is 
intact relative to  controls. However, a recent study by 
Gabrieli  et  al.  (1990)  demonstrated  intact  priming 
of  novel  dot  patterns  in  the severely  amnesic  patient 
H.M. 
Although  it  thus  seems  clear  that  amnesic  patients 
show some priming of  nonverbal  information, there is 
little evidence that such priming is normal, and none of 
the paradigms that have been used was designed with a 
view toward assessing the possible role of  the structural 
description system. The purpose of  the present study is 
to  investigate priming  of  nonverbal  information  in  a 
group of  patients with organic memory disorders, using 
an experimental paradigm in which there are empirical 
grounds to argue that the observed priming effects de- 
pend on the structural description system. 
The paradigm that we used has been developed and 
explored in experiments with college students (Schacter, 
Cooper, & Delaney,  1990; Schacter  et  al., 1991a), and 
involves presentation  and testing of  line drawings such 
as  those depicted in Figure  1. All of  the line drawings 
depict novel, unfamiliar objects that do not actually exist 
in the three-dimensional world. Half  of  the objects are 
structurally possible-their  surfaces and edges are con- 
nected such that they could exist in three-dimensional 
form-whereas  the other half are structurally impossible 
objects-they  contain ambiguous lines and planes that 
create  impossible  relations  that  would  prevent  them 
from existing in three-dimensional form. 
To  assess priming or implicit memory for these ob- 
jects, we  developed  an object decision  task  in  which 
previously studied  drawings  and nonstudied  drawings 
are briefly presented, and subjects decide whether each 
drawing is structurally possible or impossible; no refer- 
ence is made to the prior study episode. We argued that 
making the possible/impossible decision requires access 
to information about the global, three-dimensional struc- 
ture of  each object. Accordingly, we reasoned that en- 
coding  of  information  about  global  object  structure 
during a study episode should improve the accuracy of 
subsequent object  decision  performance, and that this 
priming  effect  would  constitute  evidence  of  implicit 
memory for novel visual objects. 
Our experiments using this task have provided several 
lines of  evidence that  are consistent with  these  ideas. 
The most  important findings for the present  purposes 
are that (1) priming is observed on the object decision 
test following study tasks that involve encoding of  global, 
three-dimensional  structure (e.g., judging  whether  the 
object faces primarily to the left or right), but not follow- 
ing study tasks  that  involve encoding of  local, two-di- 
mensional  features  (e.g.,  judging  whether  the  object 
contains more horizontal or vertical lines), (2) semantic 
or elaborative encoding tasks, such as generating verbal 
labels for the objects, yield much higher levels of  explicit 
memory performance on a recognition test than do  struc- 
tural encoding  tasks, but  do not  increase-and  some- 
times reduce-the  magnitude of  priming on the object 
decision  test,  (3) priming  exhibits stochastic  indeped- 
ence (Hayman & Tulving, 1989) from recognition mem- 
ory,  and  (4) priming  is  consistently  observed  for 
structurally possible objects, but not for structurally im- 
possible objects. 
The fact that priming effects on the object decision test 
require prior structural encoding, but not semantic en- 
coding, supports  the idea  that  priming  is  based  on a 
presemantic  structural description  system; the fact that 
priming can be dissociated from explicit recognition per- 
formance suggests that this system can operate indepen- 
dently  of  episodic/declarative  memory.  Within  the 
context of  these ideas, the failure to consistently observe 
priming for structurally impossible objects may indicate 
that it is difficult to compute a global structural descrip- 
tion of  an impossible object. 
In view of  these  findings with  normal  subjects, the 
performance of  patients with explicit memory deficits in 
the object decision paradigm should be informative. If 
the structural description system is spared in these pa- 
tients, and can thus establish  global representations  of 
novel  objects, then  they should  show normal  priming 
effects, with greater priming for possible than impossible 
objects. If  such priming  is not observed, however, our 
ideas about the nature of  the structural description sys- 
tem  and  its  relation  to  episodiddeclarative  memory 
would have to be revised. 
To  address these  issues, we examined  implicit and 
explicit memory  for  novel  objects in six patients  with 
organic memory disorders, six matched control subjects, 
and six student controls. All subjects initially performed 
a structural encoding task (judging whether each object 
faces  primarily to  the  left  or to  the right).  They then 
made possible/impossible object decisions about studied 
and nonstudied objects, and were subsequently given an 
explicit recognition test for all objects. 
RESULTS 
Object Decision 
Table 1 displays the proportions of  correct object deci- 
sions made about studied and nonstudied possible and 
impossible objects by the three subject groups. Overall 
baseline performance for nonstudied objects was close 
to  .50 for each group. However, patients with memory 
disorders, and matched control subjects to a lesser de- 
Scbactw, et al.  119 rigure  1.  Kepresentative ex- 
amples of  target objects that 
were used in the experiment. 
The figures in the upper two 
rows depict structurally possi- 
ble objects that could exist in 
three-dimensional form; fig- 
ures in the lower two  rows de 
pict structurally impossible 
objects that could not exist in 
three-dimensional form. 
I  I 
Table 1.  Object Decision Performance for Studied and Nonstudied Objects by Three Subject Groups 
Subject Group/Item Type 
Amnesic  Matched  Student 
Patients  Controls  Controls  M 
Object 
Type  S  NS  S  NS  S  NS  S  NS 
Possible  .83  .63  .57  .48  .70  .48  .70  .53 
Impossible  .38  .38  .55  .42  .48  .48  .47  .43 
M  .61  .51  .56  .45  .59  .48  .59  .48 
Note. Each entry indicates the proportion of  correct object decisions in a particular condition. “S” refers to studied objects and “NS” refers to 
nonstudied objects. 
120  Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience  Volume 3, Number 2 Table  2. Recognition Performance for Studied and Nonstudied Objects by Three Subject Groups 
Subject Grouplltem Type 
Amnesic  Matched  Student 
Patients  Controls  Controls  M 
Object 
0P  S  NS  S  NS  S  NS  S  NS 
~~~~~~~~  ~  ~ 
Possible  .65  .32  .70  .30  .92  .25  .76  .29 
Impossible  .42  .37  .69  .38  .78  .20  .63  .32 
M  .54  .35  .70  .34  .85  .23  .70  .31 
Note. Each entry reflects the proportion of  objects called “old” in a particular experimental condition. “S” refers to  studied objects, and the 
corresponding proportions are bit rates; “NS” refers to nonstudied objects, and the corresponding proportions are  false ahnn rates. 
gree, tended to use the “possible” response more often 
than  the  “impossible” response  for  nonstudied  items, 
whereas college students showed a nearly equal distri- 
bution of  “possible” and “impossible”  responses. In view 
of  the small number of  subjects per condition (n = 6), 
these unanticipated fluctuations in the relative frequency 
of  “possible” and “impossible” responses for nonstudied 
items are difficult to interpret. 
The critical finding  displayed  in Table  1 is  that  the 
amnesic patients’ performance  on the object  decision 
test was more accurate for studied objects (.61)  than for 
nonstudied objects (.51). Moreover, the magnitude of  the 
priming effect, as indicated by subtracting the proportion 
correct for nonstudied objects from the proportion cor- 
rect for studied objects, was virtually identical in patients 
(.lo), matched controls (.11), and student controls (.11). 
Just like normal subjects in many previous experiments, 
patients with memory disorders showed a large priming 
effect for possible objects and no priming for impossible 
objects. Five  of  the six patients showed some priming 
for possible objects; only the head-injured patient W.C. 
failed to  show any  evidence of  priming.  The  student 
control  group exhibited  a  nearly  identical  pattern  of 
results. By  contrast, the matched control group showed 
priming for both possible and impossible objects, with 
a trend  toward greater  priming  of  impossible objects. 
However, closer inspection of  the matched controls’ data 
revealed that the apparent priming of  impossible objects 
is  almost entirely attributable  to  a single subject, thus 
suggesting that the trend is probably an artifact of  small 
sample size. 
Analysis of  variance provides statistical confirmation of 
the foregoing description of  the results. There was a main 
effect of  Item Type (Studied vs. Nonstudied), F(1,15) = 
6.40, MSe  = ,006, p  < .03, confirming that significant 
priming was observed across groups. Importantly, there 
was  a  nonsignificant  main  effect  of  Subject  Group, 
F(2,15) < 1, MSe  =  ,049, and  a  nonsignificant  Item 
Type  X  Subject Group interaction, F(1,15) < 1, MSe  = 
,006, indicating that the overall magnitude of  priming did 
not  differ  across  the three groups.  A  significant main 
effect of  Object  Type was  observed, F(1,15)  =  13.14, 
MSe = ,006,p < .01,  showing a higher overall proportion 
of  possible responses than impossible responses. There 
was also a significant Item Type  X  Object Type interac- 
tion, F(91,15)  = 11.97, MSe  = .006,p < .01, indicating 
more priming of  possible than impossible objects across 
subject groups. However, these findings were qualified 
by  a significant Subject Group  X  Item Type  X  Object 
Type interaction, F(2,15) = 5.86,p < .02. The interaction 
reflects the fact that patients and student controls showed 
priming for possible but not impossible objects, whereas 
matched  controls  show a  trend  for  more priming  of 
impossible than possible objects. 
Recognition memory 
Data from the yesho recognition  test  are displayed as 
hits (i.e., “yes” responses to  studied objects) and false 
alarms (Le., “yes” responses to nonstudied objects) for 
each  subject  group (Table  2). To  correct  for possible 
criterion differences across groups, recognition accuracy 
was assessed with a corrected recognition measure (hits 
minus false alarms). These data contrast with the object 
decision results, inasmuch as they show a strong effect 
of  subject group: Recognition accuracy was lower in am- 
nesic patients (.19) than in matched controls (.36)  or in 
student  controls  (.63). Recognition was  more accurate 
for  possible  than  impossible  objects  in  each  subject 
group. 
An analysis of  variance on the corrected recognition 
scores revealed significant main effects of  Subject Group, 
F(2,15) = 13.11, MSe  = .044,p < ,001,  and Object Type, 
F(2,15) = 11.57, MSe  = .017,p < ,005, and a nonsignifi- 
cant Subject Group X  Object Type interaction, F(2,15) = 
2.29, MSe  = ,017. Planned comparisons showed signifi- 
cantly lower levels of  recognition accuracy in the patient 
group than in either matched controls, <lo) = 1.85,p  < 
.05 or student  controls,  (10)  =  5.17, p  < ,001, and 
significantly  lower  levels  of  recognition  accuracy  in 
matched controls than in student controls, t(10) = 3.26, 
p < .01. 
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Recognition 
The foregoing results indicate that patients with memory 
disorders showed intact priming on the object decision 
test despite impaired recognition. To assess the relation 
between object  decision  and recognition  performance 
more directly,  we performed  a  combined  ANOVA  in 
which Type of  Test was a within-subjects factor. For each 
subject, we entered a priming score (proportion correct 
for studied objects minus proportion correct for non- 
studied objects) and a corrected recognition score (hits 
minus false alarms). The critical outcome of  this com- 
bined ANOVA  was a significant Subject Group X  Type of 
Test interaction, F(2,15)  = 6.75, MSe  = ,041, p  < .01. 
The interaction is depicted graphically in Figure 2. 
To examine further the relation between object deci- 
sion and recognition performance, we performed  con- 
tingency analyses that  allow  us to  determine whether 
priming on the object decision task is dependent on, or 
independent of, recognition memory. In previous studies 
with college students, we have found that object decision 
priming  exhibits  stochastic  independence from  recog- 
nition performance (Schacter, Cooper, & Delaney, 1990; 
Schacter, Cooper, Delaney, Peterson, & Tharan, 1991  )- 
that is, the magnitude of  the priming effect is uncorre- 
lated with recognition performance. To assess indepen- 
dence, we used the Yule's Q statistic, a special case of 
Goodman  & Kruskal's  (1954)  gamma  correlation  that 
applies to  the analysis of  data from 2  X  2 contingency 
tables. Q is a measure of  the strength of  relation between 
two variables that can vary from +  1  (positive association) 






Figure 2.  Object decision and 
recognition performance for 
the three subject groups. Prim- 
ing scores and corrected rec- 
ognition scores are depicted 
on the y-axis. Priming scores 
were computed by subtracting 
the proportion of  correct ob- 
ject decisions for nonstudied 
items from the proportion of 
correct object decisions for 
studied items. Corrected rec- 
ognition scores were com- 
puted by subtracting the 
proportion of  "yes" responses 
to nonstudied items (false 
alarms) from the proportion of 
"yes" responses to studied 
items (hits). Priming scores re- 
mained constant across the 
three groups, whereas cor- 
rected recognition scores in- 
creased substantially, as 
indicated by a significant inter- 
action between subject group 
and type of  test. 
independence  (see Hayman & Tulving, 1989, for more 
detailed discussion). Our contingency analysis included 
only possible objects, because priming of  possible ob- 
jects was observed in all subject groups. For each of  the 
three groups, we constructed 2  X  2  contingency tables 
for studied possible objects in which each of  the four 
cells corresponded to one of the four joint outcomes of 
the object  decision  and recognition  tasks: (1)  correct 
response on both object decision  and recognition, (2) 
incorrect responses on both object decision and recog- 
nition, (3)  correct response on object decision and in- 
correct  response  on  recognition,  and  (4) correct 
response on recognition and incorrect response on ob- 
ject  decision.  The Q analysis was  performed  on each 
contingency table according to the procedure suggested 
by  Hayman and Tulving (1989). The resulting Q values 
were  -.099  for  amnesic  patients,  -.119  for  matched 
controls, and +.262 for student controls. None of  the Q 
values  differed  significantly  from  zero  (all  x2 < l), 
thereby indicating that object decision priming and rec- 
ognition memory were independent in each of  the three 
subject  groups. Although  there was  a  trend for  some 
positive association in student controls and slight nega- 
tive association in patients and in matched controls, the 
Q value  for the student  controls  group did not  differ 
significantly from  the Q value  for  either of  the other 
groups (both x2  < 1). 
It is also perhaps worth noting that we observed in- 
dependence  under  conditions  in  which  the  implicit 
memory  task  (object  decision)  preceded  the  explicit 
memory task (recognition); in our previous experiments, 
as well as in most other studies that have assessed sto- 
chastic independence (see Hayman & Tulving, 1989; Shi- 
"'I 
0.0 
Amnesic  Matched  Student 
Patients  Controls  Controls 
Subject  Population 
Object Decision 
Recognition 
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WMS-R  Recognition 
Patient  Sex  Etiology  @ears)  @ears)  IQ  GM  ATN  DY  WD  FC 
4e  Education 
~~ 
DH  F  Aneurysm  60  13  100  76  89  62  42  43 
HB  M  Aneurysm  55  12  103  93  109  62  44  30 
JW  M  Aneurysm  29  13  88  57  68  50  28  43 
KK  F  Head injury  34  14  99  72  107  67  44  39 
FK  F  Uncertain  74  12  104  52  100  54  32  30 
wc  M  Head injury  45  15  104  86  111  58  40  40 
~~  ~~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~ 
Note. IQ scores are full-scale IQs from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R). WMS-R is the Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised; 
scores for indices of general  memory (GM), attention  (ATN), and delayed recall (DR) are presented separately. The WMS-R does not provide 
scores below 50. In the normal population, each WMS-R index and the WAIS-R produce a mean of  100 and standard deviation of  15. Recognition 
memory was assessed with the Warrington Recognition Test, which is a test of  immediate, two-alternative forced-choice recognition for 50 words 
(WD) and 50 faces (FC). Maximum number correct is 50, and chance performance is 25. Patients achieved significantly lower scores than matched 
controls on GM and DR  from the WMS-R, and on the Warrington Recognitioin Test, but did not differ significantly from controls on age, education, 
or IQ (see text). 
mamura, 1985), the explicit memory task preceded the 
implicit memory task. Dependence between priming and 
explicit memory has been observed in studies in which 
an  implicit  memory  task  (fragment  completion)  pre- 
ceded  a  recognition  task  (Tulving,  Schacter, &  Stark, 
1982), but this finding was likely attributable to the fact 
that  subjects  received  an  extra  exposure to  correctly 
completed items on the fragment completion task. In the 
object decision task, however, all items received the same 
test exposure. 
DISCUSSION 
The major finding of  the present experiment is that struc- 
tural encoding of  novel visual objects produced a normal 
facilitation in  the  accuracy  of  object  decision  perfor- 
mance by patients with amnesic disorders. Intact priming 
was  observed  despite impaired performance on an ex- 
plicit  recognition  test, and  the  priming  effect  showed 
stochastic independence from recognition memory. The 
independence of  priming and explicit  memory  is also 
indicated by the observation that whereas explicit mem- 
ory performance differed markedly across the three sub- 
ject  groups,  the  magnitude  of  the  priming  effect 
remained constant (Figure 2). 
This pattern of  results provides empirical support for 
the idea that implicit memory for novel visual objects, as 
indexed by  priming on the object decision task, is me- 
diated by the structural description system, a subsystem 
of  PRS that is spared in amnesic patients. Explicit memory 
for the same objects, by contrast, appears to depend on 
an episodiddeclarative memory system that is damaged 
in these patients. There is considerable evidence that this 
latter system can be disrupted by  damage to hippocam- 
pus, diencephalon, or  basal forebrain (cf. Butters & Stuss, 
1989; Damasio  et  al.,  1985; Squire,  1987; Weiskrantz, 
1985). It is thus tempting to suggest that the acquisition 
of  novel structural descriptions of  unfamiliar objects does 
not depend on the integrity of  these brain structures, but 
this suggestion must be interpreted cautiously because 
we do not have direct evidence concerning the status of 
hippocampal or diencephalic structures in our patients. 
However, three of  our patients did have CT-documented 
damage to  basal  forebrain  (see  subjects  section), and 
these patients showed a normal pattern of  priming. An 
important task  for future studies will be to  investigate 
object  decision  priming  in  patients  with  well-docu- 
mented damage to hippocampus or diencephalon. 
It will also be important to determine whether normal 
priming of  novel visual  objects  is  observed in  patients 
with  the most  severe forms of  amnesia. Although  our 
patients clearly have significant memory deficits (Table 
3),  as a group they performed at above-chance levels on 
the yes/no recognition test for novel  objects (Table  2) 
and  on forced-choice recognition  tests  for words  and 
faces  (Table  3). Recognition  memory  is  partially  pre- 
served  in  many patients  with  memory disorders  (e.g., 
Hirst et al., 1986), but does not exceed chance levels in 
the most severe cases of  amnesia (cf. McAndrews et al., 
1987; Tulving  et  al.,  1991; Warrington  & Weiskrantz, 
1974). We  cannot yet say whether object decision prim- 
ing is  preserved  in severe amnesia, when patients’ rec- 
ognition performance is at or close to chance. It is worth 
noting,  however,  that  Gabrieli  et  al.  (1990)  observed 
intact priming of  novel patterns in the severely amnesic 
patient  H.M. despite near  chance  levels of  recognition 
performance. This finding suggests that priming of  novel 
nonverbal information  can occur in the absence of  ex- 
plicit  memory and is  consistent with  the idea that the 
structural description system plays a major role in prim- 
ing of  novel visual objects. 
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attributable to the structural description system, it is im- 
portant to understand the functional properties and neu- 
roanatomical basis of  this system. Consider first studies 
that provide information concerning the functional prop- 
erties of  the structural description  system. As  noted in 
the introduction, neuropsychological investigations dem- 
onstrating  dissociations  between  preserved  structural 
processing and impaired semantic processing in patients 
with various types of  object recognition deficits (Riddoch 
& Humphreys, 1987; Warrington, 1975, 1982;  Warrington 
& Taylor, 1978) suggest that  the structural description 
system operates at a presemantic level; that is, the system 
is not involved in processing information about an ob- 
ject’s associative or functional properties. Our studies of 
object decision  priming  in  normal  subjects  have  pro- 
vided evidence consistent with this characterization: Se- 
mantic  encoding tasks, which  yielded  higher  levels of 
explicit  memory  performance  than  did  the  lewright 
structural encoding task, either failed to produce a cor- 
responding  increase  in  priming  or did  not  yield  any 
priming at  all (Schacter, Cooper, & Delaney, 1990). We 
have observed similar patterns of  results with encoding 
tasks that require subjects to  think about functions that 
a  novel  object  might  perform  (Schacter,  Cooper,  & 
Tharan, 1991). 
We  have also carried out experiments that allow us to 
begin to characterize the nature of  the structural descrip- 
tion that is involved in object decision priming (Cooper, 
Schacter, Ballesteros, & Moore, 1990). In one study, we 
manipulated the size of  target objects between the study 
phase and the object decision or recognition tests: Object 
size remained constant from study to test in one condi- 
tion and was changed in the other condition. We  found 
that the magnitude of  the priming effect on object deci- 
sion  performance was  entirely  unaffected  by  the size 
manipulation-priming  was  just  as  large  in same  size 
and different size conditions-even  though recognition 
memory was less accurate in the different size condition 
than  in  the same size condition. This finding  suggests 
that  the  representation  that  supports  object  decision 
priming does not include size information-an  idea con- 
sistent with prior suggestions that structural descriptions 
of  objects code only relations among component parts 
(e.g.,  Humphreys & Quinlan, 1987). Along the same lines, 
we also found that priming was not reduced significantly 
by studykest changes in the left/right orientation of  target 
objects: Priming remained substantial when mirror im- 
age reflections of  studied objects were presented on the 
object decision task relative to when the same objects 
were  presented, whereas  recognition  was  significantly 
lower  in the mirror  image condition than in the same 
object condition (for similar priming results with a dif- 
ferent paradigm,  see Biederman  & Cooper,  1989). As 
noted earlier, however, object decision priming was not 
observed when subjects performed  study tasks that in- 
volve encoding information about the local parts of  an 
object; priming was only observed following study tasks 
that focus on global object structure (Schacter, Cooper, 
& Delaney, 1990). 
The foregoing observations indicate that the structural 
description that underlies object decision priming is an 
abstract, rather than literal, representation that preserves 
global structural information and remains invariant over 
changes in  size and reflection.  We  assume that  object 
decision priming would  exhibit these same properties 
in amnesic patients, and we plan to test this assumption 
in future studies. If  the assumption is correct, then our 
data suggest that amnesic patients can establish size and 
reflection  invariant structural descriptions  of  novel ob- 
jects that preserve information about global structure. 
Whereas our experimental data allow us to develop a 
preliminary sketch of  the properties of  the system that 
underlie object decision priming, we have no direct ev- 
idence concerning the neuroanatomical basis of  this sys- 
tem. Nevertheless, the functional properties that we have 
delineated provide suggestive clues concerning the brain 
stuctures that may be involved. As pointed out by  Plaut 
and Farah (1990) in a recent review, evidence from both 
human and animal studies indicates that regions of  in- 
ferior temporal cortex play a major role in representation 
of  visual  objects. Moreover, many of  the properties of 
these object representations  are quite compatible with 
the properties of  object priming noted earlier: Inferior 
temporal regions appear to be involved in representing 
global aspects of  object structure independently of  the 
retinal size of  the object or its lewright orientation (Plaut 
& Farah, 1990). Thus, object decision priming may  re- 
flect, at least in part, the establishment of  a novel struc- 
tural  description of  an object in the inferior  temporal 
region. Consistent with this suggestion, neither our pa- 
tients nor amnesic patients in general exhibit object pro- 
cessing  deficits  of  the  kind  associated  with  inferior 
temporal damage. Indeed, magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI) evidence indicates that the measured area of  the 
temporal lobes does not differ in amnesic patients and 
control subjects, whereas the area of  the hippocampal 
formation  is  markedly  reduced  in  amnesics  (Press, 
Amaral, & Squire, 1989), and temporal  neocortex is  re- 
ported to have been spared in patient H.M. (e.g.,  Gabrieli 
et al., 1990; Scoville et al., 1953). Accordingly, it seems 
plausible to suggest that inferior temporal regions could 
be involved in priming of  novel visual objects in amnesic 
patients. In addition, priming of  visual objects may also 
involve areas of  extrastriate occipital cortex and parietal 
cortex (cf. Gabrieli et al., 1990; Schacter, 1990; Schacter, 
Rapscak, et al., 1990; Warrington, 1982). 
Whatever the exact nature of  the structural description 
system that supports object decision priming, our results 
indicate clearly that patients with explicit memory deficits 
can show intact priming for novel information that does 
not have a preexisting memory representation. Although 
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priming for familiar items that have preexisting memory 
representations (e.g.,  familiar words), evidence for prim- 
ing of  novel information is mixed. For example, evidence 
for priming of  nonwords (e.g.,$zg)  in amnesic patients 
was  either absent or reduced in  studies with Korsakoff 
patients (Cermak  et  al., 1985; Smith & Oscar-Berman, 
1990). However, these patients typically have cognitive 
deficits that are not observed in other amnesic patients 
(cf. Mayes,  1988; Squire, 1987). Stronger evidence  for 
priming of  nonwords on a perceptual identification task 
has  been  observed  in two  non-Korsakoff patients  with 
severe amnesia: H.M. (Gabrieli & Keane, 1988) and the 
encephalitic patient S.S. (Cermak, Blackford, O’Connor, 
& Bleich, 1988; see also Gordon, 1988 for a rather more 
complex pattern of  results). In addition, there is evidence 
for intact priming of  nonwords in amnesic patients when 
a measure of  reading speed is used as an implicit mem- 
ory task (Musen & Squire, 1990). 
Priming of  novel information has also been examined 
in studies that have used a paradigm developed by Graf 
and  Schacter  (1985)  to  examine whether  amnesic pa- 
tients show priming of  new associations on a stem com- 
pletion  task  after  studying  a  list  of  unrelated  paired 
associates (e.g., window-reason). On the one hand, sev- 
eral experiments have shown intact priming of  new as- 
sociations  in  patients  with  relatively  mild  memory 
disorders (Graf & Schacter, 1985; Mutter, Howard, How- 
ard, & Wigs, 1990; Schacter & Graf, 1986b) and in at 
least one severely amnesic patient (Cermak, Blackford, 
O’Connor, & Bleich, 1988). On the other hand, a number 
of  experiments have reported reduced or  absent priming 
of  new associations  in severely amnesic patients  (Cer- 
mak, Bleich, & Blackford, 1988; Schacter & Graf, 1986b; 
Shimamura & Squire, 1989). Investigators who have as- 
sessed priming of  new associations with other implicit 
memory paradigms have reported both positive findings 
(Moscovitch et al., 1986) and negative findings (Tulving 
et al., 1991). Finally, an experiment that assessed priming 
of  novel information with a paradigm involving interpre- 
tation  of  ambiguous  sentences  reported  evidence  for 
some, but  not normal, priming in patients with severe 
memory disorders (McAndrews et al., 1987). 
We cannot yet specify reasons why the evidence for 
intact priming of  novel information is mixed in the fore- 
going studies, which used verbal materials, yet is robust 
in the present experiment and in the study by Gabrieli 
et al. (1990), which used nonverbal materials. Although 
it  is  possible  that  the verbaVnonverba1 nature of  the 
target items played some role, additional differences in 
study tasks, type of  target materials, test  requirements, 
and patient populations  make  it difficult to  draw firm 
conclusions regarding this issue. In addition, the para- 
digms that are used to study priming of  new associations 
often  involve  some  degree  of  semantic  processing, 
whereas the paradigms that are used to assess priming 
of  novel  nonverbal  information  appear  to  rely  almost 
entirely  on perceptuaVstructural  processing.  Thus, for 
example, it has been shown that priming of  new asso- 
ciations in the Graf and Schacter paradigm requires some 
degree of  semantic study processing (Graf & Schacter, 
1985; Schacter & Graf, 1986a), and that the ambiguous 
sentences  paradigm  used  by  McAndrews et  al.  (1987) 
relies heavily on semantic interpretive processes (Auble 
& Franks, 1979). By  contrast, there is evidence that se- 
mantic  processing  is  not  required for  object  decision 
priming  (Schacter, Cooper, & Delaney,  1990; Schacter, 
Cooper, & Tharan, 1991) or priming of  novel dot patterns 
(Musen, 1990). 
In view of  the foregoing considerations,  we suggest 
that priming  of  novel verbal  information is  sometimes 
impaired  in  patients  with  memory  disorders  because 
such priming may require the acquisition of  semantic/ 
associative  information  and hence  involves  processes 
outside of  PRS; priming of  novel nonverbal information, 
at least as assessed by object decision and dot completion 
tasks, does not appear to  involve processes  outside of 
PRS.  It is possible that the acquisition of  novel semantic 
information depends on some of  the same processes and 
structures that are involved in  the acquisition of  novel 
episodic information-processes  and structures that are 
typically damaged in patients with memory disorders (cf. 
Gabrieli, Cohen, & Corkin, 1988; Schacter, 1987a;  Squire, 
1987; Tulving et  al., 1991). These  ideas  are somewhat 
speculative and do not account for all pertinent obser- 
vations, but they are generally consistent with the exper- 
imental facts and can be tested in future research. 
Finally, we should note that our account, which de- 
pends crucially on the postulation of  multiple memory 
systems, represents just one approach to the patterns of 
data that we have observed. A number of  investigators 
have argued that dissociations between priming and ex- 
plicit memory can be explained without postulating dif- 
ferent memory systems (cf. Jacoby, 1983; Roediger, 1990; 
Moscovitch et al., 1986; Roediger & Blaxton, 1987). A- 
though such approaches can accommodate many results 
that have been observed in studies with normal subjects, 
they have not provided compelling accounts of preserved 
priming effects in amnesia (e.g., Schacter, 1987b, 1990; 
Hayman & Tulving, 1989; Tulving et al., 1991). It is not 
clear just how a unitary memory system theory would 
explain preserved priming of  novel objects in amnesic 
patients, but  no doubt some sort of  explanation could 
be formulated. The important point to stress is that our 
view provides a straightforward account of  relevant find- 
ings with amnesic patients, fits well with  the data con- 
cerning the characteristics of  object decision priming in 
normal subjects (Cooper et al., 1990; Schacter, Cooper, 
& Delaney, 1990; Schacter, Cooper, Delaney, Peterson, & 
Tharan,  1991a), and receives  support from  semantid 
structural dissociations  that have been observed in pa- 
tients with object recognition deficits (Bauer & Rubens, 
Scbac#@,  et al.  125 1985; Humphreys  & Riddoch,  1987; Warrington,  1975, 
1982). The availability of  such converging evidence from 
independent lines of  research suggests that theorizing in 
terms of  multiple memory systems represents a useful 
approach  to  understanding  dissociations  between  im- 
plicit and explicit memory. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Six patients, three males and three females, participated 
in  the  experiment. Three  patients  developed  memory 
disorders as a result of  ruptured aneurysms. Patient D.H., 
a 60-year-old female, and patient H.B.,  a 55-year-old male, 
each suffered ruptured aneurysms of  the anterior com- 
municating artery in  1988. CT  scans revealed that D.H. 
had sustained damage to basal forebrain and left  mesial 
orbitofrontal lobe, while H.B. sustained damage to basal 
forebrain, right  mesial  orbiofrontal  cortex,  as well  as 
infarction at the head of  the right caudate nucleus. Patient 
J.W.,  a 29-year-old male, experienced ruptured aneurysm 
of  the anterior communicating artery in  1980; CT  scan 
showed damage to the basal forebrain and in addition 
showed left mesial frontal infarction in the distribution 
of  the anterior cerebral artery. Patient W.C.,  a 45-year-old 
male, had suffered a closed head injury in 1983 and an 
epileptic seizure in  1988. An  MRI  scan was performed 
on this patient in 1988 and revealed significant damage 
to  the left  frontal lobe and left  temporal  lobe.  Patient 
K.K. is a 34-year-old female who received a severe closed 
head  injury  in  a  motor  vehicle  accident  in  1976 and 
remained  comatose  for  10 weeks. Patient F.K. is a 74- 
year-old female who was  referred to  the Memory Dis- 
orders Clinic at the University of  Arizona Health Sciences 
Center because her husband had observed a rather sud- 
den and marked deterioration of  memory abilities about 
6 weeks  earlier. The  results  of  a  thorough  neuropsy- 
chological evaluation were not consistent with  a diag- 
nosis of  primary degenerative dementia, but did not yield 
a certain diagnosis. 
The patients' mean age was 50 years and they had on 
average  13 years  of  education.  Their  overall  level  of 
intellectual function was  in  the normal range, as indi- 
cated by a mean IQ of  100 on the Wechsler Adult Intel- 
ligence  Scale-Revised. Mean  scores  on the  Wechsler 
Memory  Scale-Revised (WMS-R)  revealed  performance 
levels well below the mean of  100 observed in the nor- 
mal population on indices of  general memory (73), in- 
cluding the separate indices of  visual memory (82) and 
verbal memory  (75) that combine to form the general 
memory index, and delayed recall (59). Performance on 
the attention index (97) was within  normal  limits. Pa- 
tients also performed poorly on the Warrington Recog- 
nition  memory  test,  recognizing  on  average  38/50 
previously studied words and 38/50 previously studied 
faces on an  immediate  test. Data  concerning the main 
characteristics  of  individual  patients  are presented  in 
Table 3. 
The matched control group consisted of  five females 
and one male. t tests indicated that these subjects did 
not differ significantly from patients with respect to mean 
age (51 years), educational level (14 years), or WAIS-R 
IQ (108). Control subjects showed much higher levels 
of  performance than  patients  on the general  memory 
(1211, verbal  memory (114), visual memory (128), and 
delayed recall (117) indices of  the WMS-R (all ts[lO]  > 
5.09,~  < ,001); controls also scored higher (115) than 
did patients on the attention index, t = 1.94,p < .05. In 
addition, control subjects scored significantly higher than 
patients  on the Warrington Recognition Test (t = 3.97, 
p < .Ol), recognizing on average 49i50 words and 45/50 
faces. 
In addition to the patient group and the matched con- 
trols, six  University  of  Arizona  undergraduates  (three 
males and three females) took part in the main experi- 
ment. Patients and controls subjects were paid $10.00 for 
their  participation; college  students participated  in  ex- 
change for course credits. 
Materials 
The critical materials were 20 possible and 20 impossible 
objects that have been used and described by Schacter, 
Cooper, Delaney, Peterson, & Tharan (1991); represen- 
tative objects are shown in Figure  1. The objects were 
selected by Schacter et  al. on the basis of  two criteria: 
(1) when subjects were given unlimited time to decide 
whether  objects are possible  or impossible, there was 
near  perfect  agreement  about the possible/impossible 
nature of  each object (mean percent agreement across 
20 subjects was 99% for both  possible and impossible 
objects);  (2) when  subjects were given  brief  (i.e., 100 
msec) exposures to each object, object decision accuracy 
was low (about 55-60%  correct for possible and impos- 
sible objects), thereby allowing room for priming to be 
observed. 
The materials were divided randomly into two  sets, A 
and B, that each contains 10 possible and 10 impossible 
objects. Each subject studied either Set A or Set B and 
was subsequently tested on both sets. The objects were 
presented for study and test by a Compaq 386 Deskpro 
computer on the screen of  a 12 inch Princeton Ultrasync 
Monitor; they subtended a mean visual angle of  8"  when 
viewed from 60 cm. Drawings of  objects were presented 
in medium resolution and appeared white against a uni- 
form dark gray background. 
Design and Procedure 
The main experiment consisted of  four variables: Subject 
Group (amnesic patients, matched controls, and student 
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Type (possible vs. impossible), and Type of  Test (object 
decision  vs.  recognition).  The  experiment  was  com- 
pletely counterbalanced such that objects from Set A and 
Set B appeared equally often as studied and nonstudied 
objects for each of  the three subject groups. 
For  each subject, the experimental session consisted 
of  a sequence of  three main phases: left/right encoding 
task, object decision test, and yesho recognition test. For 
the leftlright encoding task, each object was exposed for 
5 sec on the computer monitor, preceded by a fixation 
point. Subjects were instructed that a series of  drawings 
would be shown on the computer screen and that their 
task was to determine whether each object appeared to 
be facing primarily to the left or to the right. They were 
told that the drawings are not as simple as they might 
appear, so that they should use the full 5 sec to inspect 
each object carefully. The task began with presentation 
of  five practice items, followed by presentation of  the 10 
possible and 10 impossible target items in random order. 
The target  items were then  presented again for  5 sec 
each and subjects made left/right judgments in the same 
manner. A previous experiment has shown that the num- 
ber of  study list repetitions does not affect the magnitude 
of priming on the object decision task (Schacter, Cooper, 
Delaney, Peterson, & Tharan, 1991, Experiment 1). 
Subjects were then given the object decision test. In 
previous studies with college students, a  100 msec ex- 
posure rate has been used. However, pilot studies with 
elderly subjects indicated that baseline performance on 
the object decision task is lower in old subjects than in 
young  subjects  when  both  are tested  with  100  msec 
exposures. Since both the patient group and the matched 
controls  were older than  the student  controls  in  this 
experiment, we used different exposure rates  in an at- 
tempt to equate baseline levels of  object decision per- 
formance: 250 msec for patients and matched controls, 
and 50 msec for student controls. Presentation  of  each 
object was immediately followed by a darkened screen. 
The data in Table  1 indicate that we were largely suc- 
cessful  in  matching  overall  levels  of  baseline  perfor- 
mance. 
Subjects were instructed that they would be exposed 
to a series of  drawings that would be flashed very quickly, 
and that they would decide whether each figure could 
actually exist in the real world. They were informed that 
some  drawings  represent valid,  possible  three-dimen- 
sional objects that could exist in the real world whereas 
others represent impossible figures that could not exist 
as three-dimensional objects in the real world, and that 
their task was to decide whether each figure is possible 
or impossible. Several examples of  possible and impos- 
sible objects (none from the target set) were then shown 
to subjects. They were instructed that all possible objects 
must have volume and be solid, that every plane on the 
drawing represents a surface of  the object, that all sur- 
faces can face in only one direction, and that every line 
on the drawing necessarily  represents an edge on the 
object. The experimenter explained the impossibilities 
in  example objects to  the subjects and answered ques- 
tions as needed. 
Matched controls and student controls responded with 
a PC  mouse that they controlled with  their right hand; 
they were told to  press the left key when they thought 
that an object was possible and the right key when they 
thought  that  an  object  was  impossible.  Patients  re- 
sponded verbally  in  order to  eliminate the possibility 
that they would forget which key to press. Administration 
of  instructions took about 2  min, and subjects were re- 
minded of  task instructions thoughout test performance. 
Ten practice items, five that had appeared on the study 
list  and five that  had  not, were then presented at the 
appropriate exposure rate for each group. These draw- 
ings were followed in an uninterrupted sequence by the 
20 studied and 20  nonstudied critical items, presented 
in a randomly determined order. Exposure of  each test 
item was preceded by the appearance of  a fixation point 
in the middle of  the monitor. Amnesic patients told the 
experimenter  “ready” when  they  were looking  at  the 
fixation point and the experimenter pressed the appro- 
priate button to initiate the trial; matched controls and 
student controls initiated the trial by pressing the center 
button on the mouse. 
Immediately following the conclusion of  the object de- 
cision task, subjects were instructed for the recognition 
task. They were told that they would be shown a further 
series of  drawings, some of  which had been presented 
when they made left/right judgments and some of  which 
had not been presented  during the left/right task. Sub- 
jects  were told  to  make  a  “yes” response  when  they 
remembered seeing a drawing during the left/right task 
and to make a “no”  response when they did not remem- 
ber seeing a drawing during the left/right task. 
The  same  10 practice  items that  were used  on the 
object decision task were presented initially on the rec- 
ognition test, followed by 20 studied and 20 nonstudied 
target figures. Drawings remained  on the screen for 5 
sec, and subjects were instructed to respond before the 
object disappeared from the screen. Patients indicated 
their yes/no response verbally, whereas control subjects 
pressed the left key to indicate a “yes” response and the 
right key to indicate a “no” response. 
After  conclusion  of  testing, subjects were debriefed 
concerning the nature of  the experiment. 
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